We used to put the Web servers in the DMZ and the Application Servers in the LAN. Now we are discussing the risks...
and benefits of an architecture with a Reverse-Proxy in the DMZ and the rest of the servers (Web & Application servers) in the LAN. What do you think about this change? What are the risks associated with an architecture based on a Reverse-Proxy?
The benefit of using Reverse-Proxy is that your actual servers have no direct connection to the Internet as they do if they are in the DMZ. Clients talk to the Proxy, which in turn can talk to the real server. In order for this to work, the proxy server needs a way to pass requests through the firewall to the real server. This is where there is some additional risk. What ports do you need to open on your firewall to make this work? Can those openings in the firewall be restricted to only proxy-to-server communications? If not, other applications could make use of the opening created to attack your LAN.
One way to minimize the risk would be to set up a seperate segment for your servers behind the firewall. Then the firewall rules that you need to implement for the reverse-proxy can be limited to that segment and not affect the rest of the LAN (assuming you are using a firewall that allows seperate rules for each segment). This gives you the benfit of reverse-proxy that you are seeking, without changing the firewall protection for the rest of the LAN.
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