Why do software manufacturers continue to produce and consumers continue to purchase unreliable and insecure software?
Why do software users willingly and repeatedly accept licensing agreements that absolve software manufacturers of most forms of liability for any design or application defects that might result in injury, harm, or damages?
Why do governments make so few demands on software manufacturers while placing onerous compliance requirements on software buyers, who are least qualified to address the problems associated with software manufacturing?
Why should software not be subject to the same public policy concerns applied to other critical elements of national infrastructure?
Why do chickens cross the road?
Each of these questions is answered in part by this simple response: to maximize utility. We all do things that might appear perfectly acceptable in our own eyes that might appear perfectly crazy to someone else. A chicken crossing the road in the presence of drivers who may be willing to flatten the poor thing simply to interrupt the monotony of driving might appear rather crazy to an outside observer. In fact, from an economist's perspective, this is perfectly rational behavior on the part of the chicken so long as the chicken believes it will be better off for the crossing. Jumping out of an airplane with a parachute might seem perfectly crazy to observers, unless the skydiver believes they are better off for the jumping. Likewise, software buyers continuing to accept software licensing terms that put them at a distinct disadvantage legally, financially, or personally should the software fail might appear perfectly baffling, unless buyers believe they will be better off for the accepting.
It is not always the utility we get out of something or some activity that matters most, but how much it potentially costs us. Costs are not always obvious to the individual at time of "purchase" so to speak, and can be hidden or otherwise obscured. In general, cost can be measured in private terms, what it directly costs an individual to behave in a certain way, or measured in social costs, what it costs society for an individual to undertake a certain activity. The balance of private and social costs is the focus of many public policy efforts.
The private cost of smoking, for instance, is relatively low monetarily from an individual's view point, but can impose substantial social costs due to the prolonged medical services associated with caring for long-term chronic smokers. Imposing a cigarette tax is but one way to raise the private cost of an activity in order to deter the behavior, which thereby potentially reduces the social cost by reducing the total number of smokers in the population and how much they smoke.
People's evaluation of utility versus cost can lead to some fairly interesting situations. As a case in point, in the United States swimming pools kill or injure more children under the age of 14 than firearms. At 16 percent, accidental drowning was the second leading cause of injury-related death of children aged 14 and under in 2004 (car accidents ranked first); compare this with only 1 percent of children that died due to accidental discharge of firearms. In fact, injury-related death due to accidental discharge of firearms ranks at the bottom of all other causes of death and injury among children including choking (17 percent), fire and burns (10 percent), and bicycle accidents, poisoning, and falls (each at 2 percent).
Played out against this background of people's desire for utility (and not always recognizing the real cost), is the story of software. The questions at the start of this section really touch on the issues of self-interest and, more importantly, the incentives we have as individuals to undertake certain activities and the utility we derive. Understanding incentives also gives us a possible foundation to address the issues of why software manufacturing seems to be in the state it is in. If it is up to humans to get the production processes for Portland cement and software correct, then it is just as important, if not more so, to understand why humans behave as they do. Incentives are a good place to start.
As such, Geekonomics is not so much the story of software told through the lens of technology, but through the lens of humanity, specifically the incentives for manufacturing, buying, and exploiting insecure software. Economics is simply one way of understanding why humans behave as they do. But if economics is generally described as "the dismal science," then software engineering is economics' freakish, serotonin-deprived cousin. Economics is positively cheery and approachable in comparison. To date, the discussion regarding software has been largely dominated by technology experts whose explanations largely serve to alienate the very people that are touched most by software. Us.
Read the rest of Chapter 1: The Foundation of Civilization (.pdf).
Reproduced from the book Geekonomics: The Real Cost of Insecure Software Copyright , Addison Wesley Professional. Reproduced by permission of Pearson Education, Inc., 800 East 96th Street, Indianapolis, IN 46240. Written permission from Pearson Education, Inc. is required for all other users.