RISK MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES
Public Key Cryptography: Q&As from your peers
Frederick Avolio
07.16.2001
Rating: -4.09- (out of 5)
Public Key Cryptography: Q&As from your peers
By Fred Avolio
This column is a bit different.
On May 31, 2001, I gave a searchSecurity audio chat entitled
Introduction to Public Key Cryptography. There were more questions
than there was time to answer them. I've selected a few to address
this month.
Q: How long would it take someone to crack 128-bit encryption?
When the press talks about "cracking" or "breaking" an encryption
algorithm, they always seem to mean this: The "attacker" decrypted a
message by guessing the secret key that was used for the encryption.
This is not breaking or cracking a particular algorithm. But it does
demonstrate the importance of key size. The key size -- the number of
bits used to store the key, which is an integer number -- determines
the size of the key space, the number of possible keys that can be
used. If you knew that to decrypt a message you needed to guess a
number between 1 and 10, would you feel challenged? How about between
1 and 1,000? How about 1 and 1^38 (1 followed by 38 zeros). That is
(roughly) the key space using a 128-bit key. For comparison purposes,
let's use a (so far) non-existent computer that can guess 1 trillion
(1 followed by 12 zeroes) keys a second. On average, it would take
around 2 million-million-million (2 followed by 18 zeroes) years to
guess the key.
Q: Didn't a research lab just break 128-bit encryption in the past
month in a little more than three hours?
Not that I can find. But this brings us to the other way someone can
"break" crypto. They can break it if the algorithm is faulty (which
is why making the algorithm public, available and subject to
examination is so important), or the implementation of the algorithm
is flawed. This has, for example, happened with the SSL
implementation in Netscape Communicator in the past.
Q: I've recently read an article that claimed an encryption algorithm
has been developed that is 'unbreakable' because of randomization,
but the article also downplayed the importance of that fact. Why
would the fact that it's 'unbreakable' be unimportant?
It would be an incredible breakthrough. It would be too good to be
true. And it probably is. It sounds like "marketing speak" to me. I
can find no such report.
Q: Is public key cryptography under threat, seeing the success of
distributed computing in cracking cryptography?
Not just public key crypto, but secret key as well. Such systems will
always be targets for attack. But the formula is much more
complicated. You have to first look at the key size and algorithm so
that you know how vulnerable it is to an attack. 128-bit AES looks
pretty good so far. Then you have to combine that with how likely it
is someone will target you or your company. Are you securing military
secrets or e-mails to your aunt in Minneapolis? It makes a
difference. And two million-million-million years, or half of that,
or a tenth of that, or even a millionth of that, is still a long
time.
Q: What are the limitations on a key size?
Algorithms are written to support a certain key size. Also, the
larger the key the longer the encryption or decryption will take. You
don't want to use crypto that takes an hour to encrypt your e-mail
before you send it. That's one example of what crypto-mathematicians
have to deal with and get right.
Q: With the public/private key system, would our messages be safe
from the government's Carnivore monitoring system?
If you mean the content of your e-mails, it certainly should be,
assuming a strong enough key-size. The address fields are not
encrypted and therefore not confidential.
Q: Is it best to have your own Certificate or Key server or to depend
on an independent third party?
Whichever you can afford, where cost is measured in the price of the
solution and the people and training required to get it to work.
There really is no difference in the security provided.
Q: My PGP Key has expired. What I can do with it? It is also located
on the certificate server.
This is an example of the sorts of trouble we can get into with these
systems. A good PKI automates this sort of thing so that as keys are
changed, certificates get updated. In this particular case, there is
not much you can do except get a new certificate.
Q: When I send encrypted e-mail, does the receiver have to use the
same software that I have, and do they need to have my public
encryption key to be able to open my e-mail?
Yes, the receiver has to use the same underlying protocols. One can
secure e-mail with the popular S/MIME and PGP protocols, the less
popular but older MOSS and PEM, or proprietary implementations, such
as ZixMail or A-Lock. You do need to have the same type of encryption
supported on both or all platforms. So, for example, e-mail encrypted
with PGP will work where there is PGP. It doesn't matter what the
Mail User Agent is (Outlook, Eudora, etc.), nor does it matter the
platform (Linux, Unix, Windows, Mac, Palm). And there are products
that will work across these platforms. Certainly, PGP is the most
famous and, perhaps, popular.
About the author:
Fred Avolio is the president and founder of Avolio Consulting, Inc.,
a Maryland-based corporation specializing in computer and network
security and dedicated to improving the state of corporate and
Internet security through education and testing.
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